Rhino horn consumers reveal why a legal trade alone won’t save rhinos

DEMAND for rhino horn in Asian markets, especially Vietnam and China, has pushed rhino populations to the brink of extinction.

In the past decade, nearly 10 000 rhinos were killed by poachers in Africa. The remaining populations in Africa and Asia are steadily declining, with fewer than 30 000 animals left in 2020 from a population of 500 000 at the beginning of the 20th century.

Rhino horn is coveted for alleged medicinal properties and as a status symbol. To stop the poaching crisis, it has been suggested that horns sustainably harvested from live rhinos can be sold in a legal trade to international buyers to meet demand.

In an international, legal trade, rhino horns can be micro-chipped, and a certification and permit system put in place to prevent laundering.

But whether legalising the international trade in rhino horn can contribute to conserve rhinos is a hotly debated question in conservation circles. Opponents argue that a legal trade will remove the stigma associated with using rhino horn and thus increase demand to a dangerous level.

Researchers at the University of Copenhagen published a new study that addresses this conundrum through an experiment with 345 rhino horn consumers in Vietnam to generate insights into their choices about purchasing rhino horn.

The researchers found that a legal trade in rhino horn would not eliminate a parallel black market, but it would likely reduce it. Our insights can be used to evaluate the likely consequences of a legal trade and to develop policies and interventions to manage demand for rhino horn.

The trade in rhino horn is highly lucrative. In the black market, rhino horn prices can fetch up to $400 000 per kg for Asian rhino horns and $20 000 per kg for African rhino horns.

The study shows that consumers do not want captive-bred rhinos who are perceived as “farmed”, like cattle or horses. They prefer, and are willing, to pay more for horns from rhinos living in the wild or semi-wild environments. This is because the consumers believe that wild rhino horns have better medicinal efficacy .

Consumers preferred a legal trade. However those with higher incomes were less concerned about legality. Hence, if the legal supply of wild rhino horns is not enough, they will likely buy poached or stolen horns from illegal suppliers.

The results show some support for the argument that a legal trade could shift the preference of a large proportion of consumers to legally supplied horns.

However, the strong preference for wild rhino horns is a major concern. As a consequence, a legal trade would likely continue to face competition from a parallel black market.

This means that the extent to which poaching would be reduced would depend on the legal supply of wild and semi-wild rhino horns, on campaigns’ ability to change consumer preferences, to what extent the legal trade would reduce stigma and increase demand, and on enforcement efforts in both supply and demand countries.

The results suggest that basing campaigns on the influence of peer reference could be a viable strategy to reduce demand by encouraging people who have experienced no or negative effects of using rhino horn to step forward in the debate.

Rhino horn consumers often listen to their peers when considering to buy or use this product. We found that the more peers used rhino horn with no, or negative, effects, the less likely consumers were to buy rhino horn.

Some important questions remain unanswered by the study.

These include; to what extent legal supplies can meet potentially rising market demand and whether consumers can be convinced that less wild rhino horn has similar health benefits, if any, as those of wild rhino horn.